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FREE SPEECH AND SPEAKER'S INTENT 
Larry Alexander* 
A few years ago, in an exchange with Cass Sunstein and 
Frederick Schauer, I criticized efforts to distinguish "high value" 
and "low value" speech, as the Supreme Court, Sunstein, and 
others have urged from time to time.t Any particular "unit" of 
speech, however such a unit is individuated, may convey an in-
definite number of ideas to its audience. The ideas conveyed 
vary depending upon what the unit of speech is taken to be, the 
context into which it is placed, and the audience to which it is 
presented. Some ideas may seem more valuable than others-
because we think some are true and important, while others are 
either false or banal-but we cannot locate the ideas that audi-
ences derive from speech in the speech itself. We cannot ban 
"low value" ideas by banning, say, "low value" movies because 
audiences may derive low value ideas from high value movies 
and vice versa. A medical textbook may be neglected by physi-
cians but eagerly sought by those who are sexually aroused by its 
pictures of sexual organs; a book of "pornographic" photographs 
may be profitably studied by psychologists and sociologists in 
whom it produces no sexual arousal whatsoever. The ideas that 
speech evokes are not locatable in the symbols employed.2 
In the same exchange, I also argued against locating the 
"value" of speech in the intentions of its authors.3 My reason 
was similar to my reason against locating value in the speech it-
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
1. Larry A. Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (1989). See also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 555 (1989); Frederick 
Schauer, The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562 
(1989). 
2. This is not to say that we cannot predict with some confidence what ideas vari-
ous audiences will receive from particular symbols. If we could not so predict, successful 
communication would be just a random event. It is to say, however, that the ideas sym-
bols produce in audiences are as much a matter of the nature of the audience and the 
context as the symbols themselves. 
This point also explains why there is no principled way to demarcate what is to count 
as a unit or item of speech for purposes of assessing whether the speech is high or low 
value. Consider (1) a photograph of two people fornicating (2) found within a medical 
textbook (3) being viewed by voyeurs (4) who are being studied by psychologists. 
3. See Alexander, 83 Nw U. L. Rev. at 548-49 (cited in note 1). 
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self. Whatever the author intends to communicate by her 
speech, it is always possible and indeed highly likely that the 
ideas the audience receives will be different. Das Kapital may be 
a "high value" work for most of its audience even if Karl Marx 
meant it as a joke, or even if it was the product of the proverbial 
thousand monkeys on typewriters. Pornography intended by its 
author only for the audience's arousal and the author's profit 
may tum out to be highly useful in sociological and psychological 
studies, just as a medical textbook may end up being read mostly 
by voyeurs in search of "dirty pictures." (Popular culture in par-
ticular is a rich mine of works intended as "high brow" that end 
up as "low brow" entertainment and works intended as en-
tertainment that end up being subjects of serious debate and 
discussion.) 
I concluded that for purposes of first amendment jurispru-
dence, the principal focus should not be on the value inhering in 
some tangible item of speech or the communicative intentions of 
authors. Instead, the focus should be on the government's rea-
sons for regulating.4 If the government regulates because it 
wishes to prevent an audience from considering certain ideas, 
either as an end in itself or, much more likely, as a means to 
some further end, then the First Amendment is in play. If the 
government's reason for regulating is not to prevent an audience 
from considering certain ideas, the First Amendment is probably 
not in play (or at least the jurisprudence shifts to the less strin-
gent time, place, and manner analysis). The government's aim to 
suppress ideas is both sufficient and necessary for invoking stan-
dard first amendment jurisprudence. Once the First Amendment 
is in play, however, the value of the targeted idea may be rele-
vant (if the idea were a false factual proposition, for example, or 
revealed private, embarrassing facts).s Additionally, the way in 
which the possession of the idea leads to harm will be relevant 
and often determinative.6 
In a recent article, Sunstein appears to agree with me that 
the locus of the value of speech is not any particular tangible 
item.7 He rightly points out that all speech is "symbolic con-
duct," and that any conduct can be used to symbolize ideas.s 
Thus, it would be wrong to locate pornography's "low value" in 
4. Id. at 553. 
5. Id. at 554. 
6. Id. 
7. Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795, 808 (1993). 
8. Id. at 833·34. 
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the tangible work itself rather than in the message the author was 
intending to communicate and the audience was receiving. 
Sunstein, however, ignores the remainder of my analysis and 
makes the author's intentions central to first amendment analy-
sis. His position now is that "speech qualifies for protection if it 
is intended and received as a contribution to social deliberation 
about some issue."9 More precisely, "conduct carrying a political 
message qualifies as speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment . . . . When it is expressive and communicative but 
nonpolitical, such conduct belongs in a second tier of protection 
["low value" speech] .... "1o 
In his latest article, as well as in the article to which I initially 
responded, Sunstein is searching for a way to justify suppression 
of pornography because pornography promotes a view of women 
that impedes women's achievement of equality.n In my view, if 
government attempts to suppress pornography for this reason, it 
is conceding the "political" nature of pornography. For first 
amendment purposes, bannning pornography for this reason is 
no different from banning political tracts that urge the subordina-
tion or sexual enslavement of women.12 
Sunstein's present position is that unless the pornographer is 
intending to convey such a message, the pornography is not high 
value political speech and is more easily regulable. For him, the 
author's intent is central to first amendment analysis, whereas for 
me, the government's intent is central. Let me briefly list some 
of the problems with Sunstein's view. 
First, Sunstein's view fails to bring within the First Amend-
ment many governmental regulations that appear intuitively to 
raise first amendment concerns. I already mentioned the possi-
bility that Das Kapital was intended, not as a serious political 
tract, but as a joke (low value entertainment), or that it was 
"written" by a thousand monkeys on typewriters (no authors' in-
9. Id. at 834. 
10. Id. at 835. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free 
Speech 130-31 (Free Press, 1993) (the highest level of protection goes to political speech, 
which is speech that is both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation 
about some issue). 
11. Sunstein, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 804-13,817-22 (cited in note 7); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589. 
12. Alexander, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 547-48 (cited in note 1). Catharine MacKinnon 
apparently accepts this conclusion, though for her it means that government should ban 
the political tracts as well as pornography, not that it should ban neither. See Catharine 
A. MacKinnon, Only Wordr 106-07 (Harvard U. Press, 1993). Sunstein, however, wants 
to stake out a middle ground in which pornography, but not political tracts, is bannable 
because of its political message. 
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tention). If government were to attempt to suppress it because 
of a fear that it would give readers subversive ideas, Sunstein's 
position would give government a first amendment green light. 
The fact that the audience is "receiving" the book as political 
does not help Sunstein's position. If an effect on the audience's 
political ideas were enough to bring the First Amendment into 
play in the absence of an author's political intent, then pornogra-
phy could not be regulated on the feminist rationale.B 
The same analysis applies if the government prohibits peo-
ple from observing a rock formation because it fears they will be 
inspired by it to adopt socially harmful views, or if it bans mili-
tary toys because it believes they inculcate militarism. There are 
no authors' intentions here, but there are surely free speech is-
sues. The same applies to bans on political tracts written by 
those, such as foreigners, who have no first amendment rights. 
Sunstein's approach also leads to a good deal of indetermi-
nacy. Conduct, including but surely not limited to the production 
of books, movies, art, and so forth, will be regulable or not de-
pending upon whether the actor intends to express some idea 
through the conduct and whether the idea is "political." The first 
amendment status of all conduct will depend in part on the ac-
tor's intention.14 
Of course, merely because an actor intends a political 
message through his conduct does not mean that the conduct is 
constitutionally immunized from regulation. As Sunstein tells us, 
much politically expressive conduct is regulable notwithstanding 
its high value first amendment status because government has a 
compelling interest in regulating it. Is That points to a third prob-
lem with Sunstein's approach, which is that the approach will 
trivialize the compelling interest test. Or, put differently, lots of 
governmental interests that we ordinarily would not think of as 
"compelling" will come out as such under Sunstein's approach. 
Sunstein himself gives an example of this when he says that polit-
ical graffiti on public monuments can be prohibited (despite the 
author's political intention) because the government has a "pow-
erful" interest in "protecting public monuments."16 The point is 
that under Sunstein's approach, all of the multitude of everyday 
regulations which we do not believe people should be able to 
violate just because they have a political point to make will end 
13. Sunstein is in fact explicit that speaker's political intent is necessary for deeming 
speech political. See note 10 supra. 
14. See Sunstein, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 834-36 (cited in note 7). 
15. Id. at 834-35. 
16. ld. at 834. 
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up being deemed to serve "powerful" government interests. The 
result will be that any government interest-including keeping 
people from sleeping in parks, preventing the destruction of draft 
cards, and so forth-will be a "compelling" interest, and the 
compelling interest test will be analytically useless. 
Sunstein is not alone in the error of focusing on the 
speaker's intent in first amendment analysis. The Supreme Court 
itself in Brandenburg v. Ohiot7 appears to make the first amend-
ment status of speech that incites imminent lawless action tum 
on whether the speaker intended the incitement. That position is 
counterintuitive, however. Although the speaker's state of mind 
should be material to criminal law analysis, it should be immate-
rial to the first amendment status of the speech, at least if there is 
no danger of chilling protected speech. If I know that my speech 
will "incite" someone to commit an illegal act immediately, 
before there is an opportunity for counterspeech, then it should 
be immaterial that I do not "intend" the illegal act. (When I do 
not know that my speech will incite others to illegal acts but am 
negligent in that regard, punishing me may be of first amend-
ment concern because it may chill other, protected expression. 
In that sense, my mental state is material to the First Amend-
ment in the same way that it is in defamation cases, derivatively 
and instrumentally, but not because it affects the first amend-
ment status of the speech per se.) 
It is not the speaker's intention in speaking but the govern-
ment's intention in regulating that should bring the First Amend-
ment into play. If the government closes a beach because 
conditions are unsafe, that should not be a first amendment case. 
If it closes the beach because people are getting subversive ideas 
from looking at the ocean, that should be a first amendment case. 
If government forbids destruction of draft cards because of the 
costs of reissuing them, that should not be a first amendment 
case, even if some who destroy draft cards do so to express polit-
ical ideas. If government forbids destruction of draft cards to 
prevent those political ideas from being communicated, that 
should be a first amendment case, even if no one intends a polit-
ical message in destroying a draft card. 
Once the First Amendment is triggered by virtue of govern-
ment's regulatory intention, the analysis should focus on the ulti-
mate harm the government is seeking to avert by interdicting the 
receipt of a message and the causal mechanism through which 
receipt of the message leads to the harm. Traditional first 
17. 395 u.s. 444 (1969). 
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amendment analysis largely does just this, and first amendment 
cases can be usefully grouped according to the types of harm 
messages cause and the causal mechanisms by which they cause 
those types of harm.ts 
Under my analysis, the First Amendment is not implicated 
by regulations that impact speech but that are based on speech-
independent governmental reasons, those that Larry Tribe would 
call Track Two regulations.t9 (An example is government's clos-
ing the beach because of unsafe conditions when that closure 
prevents people from receiving political "messages" caused by 
viewing the ocean, or, more prosaically, prevents people from 
congregating and discussing politics.) My analysis implies a First 
Amendment with only one track. So whereas Sunstein's 
"speaker's intent" approach is underinclusive in the respects I 
have listed, my "government's intent" approach is underinclusive 
in others. 
I have two responses to this point. First, Sunstein's ap-
proach handles Track Two cases badly by stretching the notion of 
a compelling governmental interest to the point of uselessness.zo 
Second, I believe that Track Two jurisprudence has been an ex-
tremely unsuccessful jurisprudential exercise, with only a few 
very arbitrary victories for speakers in a period of over fifty 
years.21 It should be dropped from first amendment analysis. 
* * * * * 
To paint with a very broad brush, there are two dominant 
views in the jurisprudence and the scholarly commentary regard-
ing the nature of constitutional free speech. On one view-the 
18. For example, the harms government seeks to prevent through content regulation 
include: illegal actions; revelations of private facts, confidences, and secrets; invasions of 
copyrighted and related property interests; defamations; inflictions of emotional distress; 
offenses to sensibilities; disruptions of workplace relationships; coercion; and so on. The 
causal mechanisms can be usefully divided into those that require sanctionable listener 
choices in response to the content for the harms to occur (e.g., incitement to crime); those 
that require responsible but nonsanctionable listener choices in response to the content 
for the harms to occur (e.g., defamation; revelation of national security information to 
foreign powers); and those that do not require any listener choices for the harms to occur 
(e.g., revelation of embarrassing private facts). 
19. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12·2, at 791 (Foundation 
Press, 2d ed. 1988). 
20. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra. 
21. See Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: lncidentJJl Regulations of Speech 
and Free Speech Theory, 44 Hastings LJ. 921 (1993). The two Track 1\vo cases decided by 
the Supreme Court after publication of the cited article do nothing to call this observation 
into question. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. a. 2038 (1994); Madsen v. Women's 
Health Center, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). 
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view I hold-free speech is about limitations on the govern-
ment's authority deliberately to control what facts we know and 
what arguments and ideas we consider. On the other view, free 
speech is about the quality of public discourse. The primary 
shortcoming of the first view is that it has nothing to say about 
the myriad government rules and decisions that, though not 
aimed at our beliefs and attitudes, have profound effects on our 
beliefs and attitudes and ultimately the quality of our democratic 
self-rule and our personal autonomy. 
The primary shortcoming of the second view is that it re-
quires rather than forbids government deliberately to affect our 
information, arguments, and ideas; and thus it necessitates re-
course to an Archimedean point from which information, argu-
ments, and ideas can be evaluated.z2 Government policy, which 
depends for its legitimacy on being the product of the public dis-
course, is on this view to be directed toward structuring that very 
discourse.23 Deliberate censorship, the core first amendment vi-
olation on the first view, becomes on this view a first amendment 
command.24 
Sunstein's concerns seem to align him more with the second 
view than the first. Yet, the jurisprudential apparatus he em-
ploys-a hierarchy of types of speech, with "political" receiving 
the greatest protection; the reliance on speaker's intent to bring 
conduct within the First Amendment and to identify its place in 
22. Reference to the lack of an Archimedean point may seem like a cheap shot. Is it 
really impossible to determine whether government is enriching or impoverishing public 
discourse? 
Of course it is not impossible to do so from anyone's particular point of view. Each 
one of us knows what would be an improvement of the public discourse-which ideas 
should receive more play and which should receive less. Each one of us knows when the 
public discourse is "balanced" and "diverse" and when it is not. 
The problem is that there is no noncontroversial overarching point of view from 
which these evaluations can be made. Would we be happy if the government decided that 
there was too much in the way of speech resources devoted to free market arguments, 
sitcoms, and baseball and too little devoted to monarchism, socialism, art history, and 
rugby? Some of us would, and some would not. From what or whose perspective should 
this government attempt deliberately to structure the public discourse be judged? The 
majority's? The Supreme Court's? 
23. Again, I am not denying the obvious truth that under my view, government ac-
tions also structure the public discourse. All laws and governmental acts result in a par-
ticular distribution of resources and set of regulations that affect what gets said by whom 
and to what effect. On my view, however, these government actions may structure the 
public discourse not as a matter of deliberate aim but only as an unintended consequence 
of other goals. On my view, free speech is a deontological principle about the respect 
government must show for people's autonomy, not a consequentialist one about how to 
structure public discourse. 
24. Whenever government determines that enough has been said on some topic, or 
that a given idea is really the same as one that has already been "adequately voiced," it is 
necessarily engaged in censorship. 
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the speech hierarchy; and the compelling governmental interest 
test for non-content-related restrictions on expressive conduct-
does not fit neatly with either view. Perhaps he wishes to steer a 
middle course between the two camps and believes his jurispru-
dence produces the advantages of both views and the shortcom-
ings of neither. From where I sit, however, Sunstein's 
jurisprudence, particularly his reliance on speaker's intent, has 
no such redeeming virtue. It is an approach in desperate need of 
a rationale. 
